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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Assistant Director, Reports and Estimates DATE: 12 December 1949

FROM : Chief, Global Survey Division

SUBJECT: Comment on Staff Study, "A Concept of National Intelligence Production on the Far East" (Tab A).

Reference : EPB Notice No. 2-49

1. The Staff Study under consideration is unfit for submission to the Director of Central Intelligence and to the National Security Council. It should be withdrawn.

2. Detailed written comment in support of the foregoing conclusion would include adverse criticism of every paragraph and of almost every sentence in the Study and would greatly exceed the Study itself in length. Urgent tasks of intelligence production preclude the preparation of such a paper. I am, however, prepared to support orally the following general criticisms.

a. The concept presented is Communistic in ideology and consequently does not correspond with United States policy objectives and security interests as authoritatively set forth in public pronouncements and in NSC documents. Its submission to the NSC for approval would be at best naive, at worst offensive.

b. The estimate found in paragraph 2 is tendentious throughout. Developed within the limitations of an exclusively regional interest and competence, it is not a valid appreciation of the significance of the Far East in the global situation or in the global security interests of the United States.

c. This a priori estimate tends to prejudge the findings of that program of intelligence production which it purports to introduce. The occasional insertion of the word "possibly" does not relieve it of that prejudicial character.

d. This wordy approach is totally unnecessary to accomplish the action required. The salient intelligence problems in relation to the Far East can be identified readily enough without this preamble. What is needed for their solution is less abracadabra of "production planning", less propaganda to gain attention for the area (which is now accomplished), less diversion of thought and energy from the real work to be done, and a better concerted effort to reach objective and well-founded conclusions with respect to obvious, but unsolved, intelligence problems.

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e. The conclusions presented in paragraph 3 are so generalized, obvious, and incomplete that their approval by the NSC would have no apparent meaning or utility. Indeed, I would expect the NSC to question the professional competence of a Director of Central Intelligence who submitted such a question for Council action.

3. The foregoing observations are made with reference to the text of Tab A exclusively, in accordance with my understanding of EPB Notice No. 2-49. I beg leave to submit, however, that, for similar reasons, I question the validity and realism of the planning concept of which Tab A is intended to serve as partial implementation.



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LUDWELL L. MONTAGUE

cc AD/ORE
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